Founded on science

Volume 34, Issue 4 (July-August 2023)
CEOs who communicate too much control and independence from shareholders are disproportionately targeted by activists.

Vol. 64, No. 3 (June 2021)
Companies that invest too heavily in long-term pursuits without demonstrating strong financial returns draw the attention of activists.

Volume 33, Issue 3 (May-June 2022)
The motives executives communicate in their conversations with shareholders influence their strategic responses to short seller activism.

Volume 35, Issue 2 (March-April 2024)
Boards that are too demographically diverse can increase targeting by activist shareholders

Volume 41, Issue 13 (December 2020)
Target companies are more likely to settle with activists that are known for being confrontational.

Volume 34, Issue 4 (July-August 2023)
Activists that express more confidence in their letters to management are more likely to succeed in their campaigns.

First published online (May 29, 2024)
Activists tend to withdraw demands from companies whose target management and boards exhibit communication styles similar to their own.

Volume 141, Issue 1 (July 2021)
Companies with female CEOs are more likely to be targeted by activists than those with male CEOs.

Volume 63, Issue 6 (December 2020)
Companies consolidate and scale back growth initiatives following shareholder activism.

Volume 39, Issue 6 (November–December 2020)
Hedge fund activism can increase the likelihood of CEO turnover.

Volume 107 (October 2019)
Activist involvement can improve share repurchase decisions.